



















The task environment, characterized by the degree of complexity, variability, and routine 
of workers’ tasks, creates varying degrees of asymmetric information between workers and 
their supervisors, as well as poses varying degrees of difficulty for supervisors and workers 
in making correct decisions. Thus the task environment generates internal uncertainty, 
some of which is under the control of workers, in contrast with external uncertainty, which 
arises from the market and is beyond their control. The measures that address problems 
associated with internal uncertainty (including incentives, delegation of decision-making to 
workers, monitoring by supervisors and internal labor markets) are elements of 
organization design. We explore theoretically and empirically the relationship between 
uncertainty and organization design, expanding on Baker and Jorgensen’s (2003) idea that 
the risk-incentives relationship depends on the nature and sources of risk and Prendergast’s 
(2002a) idea that incentive pay is not a direct response to a firm’s task attributes but is part 
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  The twin desires to increase worker effort and have it directed more precisely towards 
organizational objectives have motivated countless attempts at reorganization and redesign of 
work in organizations. A large literature in economics has been devoted to measures that can 
elicit worker effort that is optimal relative to principals’ objectives. The choice of such 
measures is the problem of organization design. Until fairly recently, organization design has 
been restricted to the choice of incentives, with a relatively simple prescription: when agent 
effort is costlessly observable the optimal design (contract) should consist of fixed wages, but 
in the presence of asymmetric information that favors agents, some sharing arrangement 
should be instituted. Workers’ share of the results of their efforts should bear a negative 
relationship to the degree of uncertainty that affects the results but is beyond the control of 
workers.  
In recent years, the economics literature on organization design has expanded 
considerably but the basic relationship between uncertainty and incentives remains central to 
the understanding of organization design, and the relationship between incentives and other 
elements of organization design remains little studied. Recent contributions by Baker and 
Jorgensen (2003) and Prendergast (2002a) provide new ideas and challenges on both points, 
and supply the motivation and the starting point of the present paper.  
Prendergast (2002a) argues that there is asymmetric information between agent-
workers and principal-managers that arises from the workers’ task environment. The 
principal’s limited information creates for her uncertainty regarding outcomes and induces her 
to renounce making some decisions by delegating them to her better-informed agents. In order 
to induce agents to make good decisions on her behalf, the principal provides them with 
financial incentives. Hence greater uncertainty leads to more delegation and therefore greater 
reliance on incentives. This positive correlation between risk and incentives contrasts with standard agency theory’s central prediction that greater uncertainty limits  reliance on 
incentives so as not to impose too large risks on risk-averse agents.  
  Baker and Jorgensen (2003) attribute this “local and empirical ambiguity results to a 
failure to distinguish different types of uncertainty.” External uncertainty (labeled by Baker 
and Jorgensen as “noise”) arises from the market and other aspects of the external 
environment; it is the same for principals and their agents and is beyond the control of both 
parties, and therefore agents should not react to it and should not bear any risk associated with 
it. In contrast, asymmetric information between principals and agents associated with agents’ 
specific knowledge may change their actions and creates strategic or internal uncertainty for 
principals (“volatility”). 
  Incentives and decision-making delegation are two important elements of organization 
design but there are additional elements that complement or substitute for them. In particular, 
firms rely on monitoring of inputs and outputs to ensure that workers act correctly (e.g., Hart 
and Moore, 2005, Garicano, 2000), and on internal labor market practices to provide long-term 
incentives, accumulate firm-specific knowledge, aid in the collection of information about 
worker behavior, and contend with issues of ex post hold-up problems associated with various 
incentive contracts (e.g., MacLeod and Carmichael, 2000).  
In this paper we build on and integrate previous contributions to develop a theoretical 
framework that regards organization design as a set of measures assembled to ameliorate 
various problems that may occur in organizations. We classify these problems as technical-
administrative if they arise from bounded rationality and as agency-managerial if they stem 
from the pursuit of self-interest. We argue that depending upon the nature of informational 
problems, incentives will be used as a direct response to uncertainty (Baker and Jorgenson, 
2003) or through the use of delegation of decision-making (Prendergast, 2002a).  We further 
extend the argument in view of the substitution opportunities and complementarities with 
monitoring and internal labor market practices, two additional organizational design measures 
that have played a central role in economic analysis. 
Organization design is an involved process whereby the principal selects a combination 
of complementary and substitutable practices that together direct and improve the effort of workers in order to pursue organizational objectives given various constraints and 
contingencies. For example, even in a relatively simple operation such as a restaurant and 
focusing only on the wait staff, the manager has to choose how much discretion to permit the 
wait staff in terms of choices of items not on the menu; whether to have each table serviced by 
a single member of the wait staff or possibly more; whether to require  waiters to pool tips and 
divide them equally among the waiters or allow individuals to keep the tips they earn; whether 
to have a staff meeting before the dinner crowd arrives to decide how to introduce specials or 
how to deal with particular clients; whether to allow waiters to explain to kitchen staff details 
of certain orders; how much to monitor the way orders are taken, food is brought to the table 
and so on; how much training to provide; whether to supply promotion opportunities, and 
more. There is no universally best way of making these choices: restaurant managers need to 
consider how complex is the menu, how complicated is the food preparation, how much 
flexibility the restaurant wants to provide to its clients, what is its desired level of service, and 
how predictable are the flow of diners and their food choices. 
  The choices of firms regarding the degree of delegation, monitoring, incentives and 
internal labor market practices in response to uncertainty and the interplay among these 
practices have been studied previously. Some studies have demonstrated a significant positive 
link between risk and delegation in the context of franchising (Lafontaine and Slade, 1991), 
significant positive link between delegation and incentives (MacLeod and Parent, 1999, Nagar, 
2002), whereas others have examined the firm’s choice between monitoring and pay 
suggesting that firms use pay (efficiency wage) as a substitute for monitoring (Neal 1993, 
Rebitzer 1995). Foss and Laursen (2005) and DeVaro and Kurtulus (2006) analyze the effect 
of uncertainty on the relationship between incentives and delegation of decision-making, and 
find positive correlations between risk and delegation and between delegation and incentives 
but only limited support for the instrumental role of delegation. Given the data restrictions and 
measurement issues that previous studies have faced, the empirical analyses in the extant 
literature are piecemeal and consider at most two elements of organization design, with limited 
ability to relate firms’ choices to various contingencies. Thanks to a uniquely rich dataset on a cross-section of 640 Minnesota-based firms we 
are able to explore many of the relationships we characterize theoretically. Our empirical 
analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we reexamine the relationship between risk and 
incentives by applying Baker and Jorgenson’s and Prendergast’s arguments about different 
sources of uncertainty and the instrumental role of delegation of decision-making to the 
employment relationship between shop-floor workers and their supervisors. Second, we extend 
these arguments to include a broader set of organization practices. Our dataset contains survey 
information on individual, group and firm-based performance-pay plans for shop-floor 
workers, on monitoring and internal labor market practices, as well as information on external 
uncertainty (measured as the volatility of income in a firm’s industry) and internal uncertainty 
(measured as the complexity, variability and routine of front-line workers’ tasks). We are 
therefore able to identify the differential relationship between external and internal sources of 
uncertainty and several types of incentive plans and other elements of organization design. 
The results confirm the importance of the distinction suggested by Baker and Jorgensen 
between different types of risk depending on the type of informational issues faced by the firm 
as a whole, its supervisors and its workers. We find strong evidence of a negative relationship 
between external uncertainty and incentives linked to firm-level performance (profit sharing), 
but not between external uncertainty and individual incentives. The findings also highlight the 
crucial role played by delegation of decision-making. We find that decision-making delegation 
is significantly and positively linked to internal uncertainty and after delegation is controlled-
for, individual-level incentives are effectively unrelated to internal uncertainty. The 
instrumental role of delegation in the risk-incentives trade-off predicted by Prendergast is 
empirically validated for individual and group-level incentives plans. 
We also provide the first empirical evidence of relationships among additional 
organization design practices whose individual and combined importance, although widely 
discussed theoretically, has not been empirically validated within a single conceptual 
framework. We find that internal uncertainty (that is, shop-floor workers’ task environment) 
influences substantially organization design through delegation of decision-making as well as monitoring. There is also evidence of substitutability between firm-level incentives and 
monitoring and internal labor market practices. 
  The paper proceeds as follows. Section II outlines the theoretical framework. Section 
III describes the data and empirical strategy, and Section IV is devoted to a discussion of the 
results. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. Theoretical Framework 
  The tradeoff between risk and incentives is a key element of the agency theory 
literature. In the basic agency model, risk is characterized by the addition of a random noise in 
the worker’s effort-output function creating variability in output that cannot be uniquely 
attributed to the agent’s effort. As a result, the use of incentives that link pay to output is 
hypothesized to decrease with an increase in the variance of the noise. Empirical tests of the 
negative relationship between risk and incentives have brought inconclusive results, calling for 
a reassessment of the theory.
1  
Baker and Jorgensen (2003) extend the definition of risk by introducing uncertainty that 
affects the agent’s optimal choice of effort, which they call volatility, in addition to a random 
noise affecting output. Prendergast (2002a) adds delegation of decision-making to the set of 
possible decisions available to a firm that faces risk; risk arises from informational problems 
associated with agents work environment.  
In this section we develop a framework that integrates these studies’ insights about risk 
and uncertainty and organization-design responses in the form of incentives and delegation. 
We emphasize the market and the task environments as the sources of differing degrees of 
incomplete and asymmetric information and of varying demands on workers’ and supervisors’ 
skills, knowledge and abilities, which generate various problems that affect a firm’s success in 
pursuit of its goals. These problems can be countered by incentives and delegation of decision-
making, as well as additional elements of organization design. We focus our theoretical and 
empirical analysis on the shop-floor level and concentrate on the relationship between core 
workers and their supervisors, rather than deal with the complexities of design of the entire 
                                                 
1 See Prendergast (2002a) and De Varo and Kurtulus (2006) for a review of the evidence. organization. Core workers may work on an assembly line, be cashiers and vendors in a retail 
establishment or tellers in a bank and waiters in a restaurant; software engineers are core 
workers in a software-development company as are professors at a university.
2  
 
What Drives Organization Design? Agency-Managerial and Technical-Administrative 
Problems, External and Internal Uncertainty 
The design questions that a restaurant manager has to answer are similar to those that 
managers in other settings must address: should employees be paid only fixed wages or a 
combination of fixed pay and incentives, should supervisors assign narrowly-defined tasks to 
their subordinates or instead delegate to them some rights and responsibilities to decide how 
and when the work should be done, how much supervisors should monitor employees and 
whether or not an internal labor market should be established. The design is aimed to get 
employees to work effectively towards the goals of the organization by addressing two major 
types of problems: those that stem from insufficient knowledge, skills or abilities required to 
carry out certain tasks, and those that arise from the pursuit of self-interest. The first type of 
problems, emphasized by ‘team-theory’ and ‘bounded-rationality’ economists, may be termed 
technical-administrative (TA) problems, whereas the second type, the hallmark of agency 
theory, may be called agency-managerial (AM) problems.
3  
  Were workers perfectly skilled and knowledgeable relative to the requirements of their 
jobs, and assuming away any AM problems, the organization design problem would have been 
simple: the head of the organization would ask for information that would be promptly, 
costlessly and flawlessly supplied, would solve the maximization problem for the firm, and 
then would send specific instructions for execution in the rest of the organization, including 
shop-floor workers. No supervisors, no monitoring, and no incentives would be needed, 
because everything would flow just as the head of the organization had wanted. Workers 
would be paid fixed wages set at a level just sufficient to attract them to the firm. However, 
this is obviously not the case in any realistic setting. To varying degrees, workers make good 
                                                 
2 Throughout the paper we use the terms core employees, core workers, and shop-floor workers and employees 
interchangeably. Osterman (1994) discusses the concept of core employees in detail.  
3 This terminology is used by Ben-Ner, Montias and Neuberger (1993). but imperfect decisions; they gather, interpret, summarize and transmit some but not all useful 
information; and they misinterpret some information and make erroneous decisions – all 
manifestations of TA problems. 
  Were workers perfectly obedient subordinates of their superiors, that is, perfect agents 
who do what they are told, no more and no less, and assuming away any TA problems, the 
organization design problem would have again been simple: the head of the organization 
would announce a set of tasks for all workers, and they would just follow instructions; no 
incentives, monitoring and other familiar practices would be required. Few if any real-life 
organizations have this sort of workers. To various extents, workers work less hard than they 
can, they choose, when they can, to carry out tasks that are more agreeable to them by way of 
effort or interest, and make choices that sometimes favor them at the expense of what they 
know is best for the rest of the firm – all manifestations of AM problems. 
  Organization design aims at getting employees to do well what principals want; this is 
equivalent to amelioration of potential TA and AM problems. Our interest is in those elements 
of organization design that affect the behavior of core employees, the shop-floor level workers, 
who are the focus of our empirical analysis. Core employees are agents to a supervisor who is a 
quasi-principal on behalf of higher-level management. At this level, organization design 
consists principally of the choice of the degrees of: 1) the addition of incentives to fixed wages; 
2) the delegation of decision-making responsibilities to workers vs. supervisors; 3) the 
monitoring of workers by their supervisors; and 4) the offering of promotion and training 
opportunities as elements of internal labor markets.
4
  Our analysis rests on conventional assumptions: workers are risk averse, have limited 
skills, knowledge and abilities, and are willing to pursue their own interests if an opportunity 
presents itself. We treat supervisors as quasi-principals, and disregard the TA and AM 
problems arising from their relationship with higher-level management and firm owners.  
                                                 
4 There exist additional elements such as employee recruiting and selection that will not be addressed in this 
paper. Our aim is to incorporate in the analysis of organization design key elements that figure prominently in the 
economic literature as well as in practice.    We now turn to examine how the external and internal environments in a firm create 
uncertainty and generate AM and TA problems, and then continue with an analysis of how 
application of elements of organizational design can reduce the extent of these problems.  
  External uncertainty, noise in Baker and Jorgensen’s (2003) language, stems from 
sources that are not under the control of the unit under consideration. At the shop-floor level 
external uncertainty regards the level of future demand for shop-floor activities and is 
generated by the market or other units that interact with the shop floor; it is the same for 
workers and their supervisors. The impact of external uncertainty on incentives is predicted 
well by agency theory: the greater the uncertainty the less likely it is that a firm will offer its 
risk-averse core employees incentives linked to the sources of uncertainty that are not 
controllable by workers at the shop-floor.  
  Internal uncertainty arises from the task environment at the workplace. We argue that 
internal uncertainty (a) is an increasing function of the difficulty of the task environment, (b) 
creates AM and TA problems at the shop-floor level, and (c) affects differentially workers and 
supervisors. We explain below how these assumptions matter for understanding the differential 
effects of uncertainty defined by the task environment on organization design. 
The severity of potential TA and AM problems, given a particular workforce, is 
affected by factors that place demands on workers’ and supervisors’ skills and abilities, and 
factors that afford workers opportunities to pursue their self-interest. These two overlapping set 
of factors are grounded in workers’ jobs. Jobs are designed for efficiency relative to 
organizations’ business strategy, technology, workforce, and labor and product market 
conditions (Zoghi, Levenson, and Gibbs, 2005, Lindbeck and Snower, 2000). A job consists of 
a series of tasks that a worker has to execute. The jobs thus define the task environment and 
determine the severity of TA and AM problems.  
A characterization of tasks that is particularly relevant to the understanding of TA and 
AM problems considers how simple or complex, stable or variable, and routine or non-routine 
tasks are.
5 These three task attributes affect workers’ ability to make good decisions, the 
                                                 
5 See Perrow (1986), Grandori (1991), March and Simon (1993), Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) and Manning 
(2005) for related discussions of task attributes. The terminology used here is patterned after that used by Perrow 
(1986).  information workers have about the association between their efforts and results, and the 
information supervisors have about what workers do and how hard they work.  
Task complexity. The execution of complex tasks requires more skillful, thoughtful and 
experienced decision-making, and is more prone to errors than the execution of simple tasks. 
For example, the task of solving a system of nonlinear equations is more complex than the task 
of solving for x in 3x=6; the task of extracting a tumor from a brain cavity is more complex 
than the task of extracting a splinter from a finger; the task of serving a customer in a fast-food 
restaurant is simpler than the task of serving a demanding customer in an expensive restaurant; 
and the task of writing a report about local crime statistics is simpler than the task of analyzing 
the reasons for changes in the incidence of local crimes.  
Task complexity affects the information sets of both workers and their supervisors. The 
worker who carries out a complex task is in a better position than a supervisor to determine the 
specific demands of a particular situation. The worker has better information about the 
complex circumstances of his job and what may be the best course of action than the 
supervisor does. The worker could, in principle, transmit his information to the supervisor so 
that she could make the key decisions for the worker, but the lack of reliability of transmission 
of information increases with the complexity of the worker’s tasks.
6 Supervisors’ incomplete 
information is a TA problem that may lead, as we discuss later, to possible delegation of 
decision-making power from the supervisor to the shop floor worker. Although the worker has 
better information than the supervisor, he too suffers from incomplete information regarding 
the possible outcomes of his actions, and the uncertainty of outcomes is likely to increase with 
the complexity of the worker’s tasks. This is a TA problem faced by the worker.  
The execution of complex tasks creates also a classic asymmetric information situation 
whereby the worker knows better than the supervisor what and how various factors (such as 
the multifaceted efforts of the worker and of other workers and managers, equipment, the 
quality of materials) combine to determine the outcome of the execution of the task. 
Asymmetric information creates opportunities for the emergence of standard AM problems.  
                                                 
6 The problem with reliable transmission of information is twofold. First, because of the complexity of the 
situation at the shop floor the information is difficult to formulate, transmit and then decipher (Marshack and 
Radner, 1974). Second, because workers have incentives to portray information in ways favoring their interests, 
supervisors will not trust the information because they cannot verify it.   Task variability. Workers’ tasks may remain unchanged for certain periods of time, as 
is the case of an assembly line where a worker installs windows for several hours, or may be 
moderately variable in the case of a bank teller who works with patrons with different needs, 
and even more variable for a general dentist. The greater the variability of a task the more 
careful, skilled and experienced a worker must be in order to execute the task faithfully, and 
the less effectively can a supervisor observe the quality of the execution of different 
dimensions of the task (unless more time is invested in monitoring). The effects of task 
variability on AM and TA problems and on uncertainty for the worker are similar to those of 
task complexity. 
  Task routine. Routine reflects the incidence of exceptions in the execution of tasks. 
The tasks of an assembly line worker, bank teller and general dentist are routine (although they 
differ in the degrees of complexity and variability), whereas the tasks of a researcher and of a 
developer of new electronic games are non-routine. Routine tasks are easier to execute and are 
easier to observe by a supervisor than non-routine tasks. Given other task attributes, the less 
routine a task is, the more severe will be the AM and TA problems. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that the more complex, variable and non-routine are 
the tasks of front-line workers the more severe and difficult will be the TA and AM problems. 
Henceforth we will refer to the difficulty of the task environment as a way to capture the 
combined effect of more complex, variable and non-routine tasks. In the empirical work 
reported in the next section, we measure the difficulty of the task environment as the sum of 
the scores (on a 1-5 scale) of complexity, variability, and non-routine. The arguments we made 
above in our discussion of complexity apply also to the broader concept of task environment. A 
more difficult task environment creates greater TA problems for supervisors, greater TA 
problems for workers and more difficult AM problems between supervisors and workers. In 
the remainder of this section we describe the organization design responses to each type of 
problem focusing on incentives first and then considering additional organizational design 
choices like delegation, monitoring and internal labor market practices which may complement 
or substitute for incentives. 
 Organization Design Responses to Internal and External Uncertainty 
The task environment generates AM problems through the asymmetric information it 
creates, because the more difficult the task environment, the fewer the opportunities for 
supervisors to observe costlessly workers’ efforts. The organization-design response to AM 
problems related to asymmetric-information consists of incentives that better align workers’ 
interests with those of the organization – the standard solution from agency theory. This 
argument is similar to Baker and Jorgenson (2003)’s argument about the positive effect of 
volatility on incentives. Thus the likelihood of reliance on incentives and their strength 
increases with the degree of internal uncertainty about the valuable information regarding how 
to do the job that workers possess but supervisors do not.     
A difficult task environment can also generate TA problems for the workers and reduce 
their control over outcomes. If workers are risk averse, then the resulting uncertainty for them 
will increase the firm’s cost of incentives and therefore lower the likelihood that they will be 
offered. Generally, uncertainty – whether external, arising from the market and other units in 
the organization, or internal, stemming from workers’ TA problems – impacts controllability 
by workers and therefore incentives should be used less to motivate risk-averse workers.  
In addition, the difficulty of the task environment impacts supervisors’ ability to make 
informed decisions about how shop-floor workers should carry out their activities. This is a TA 
problem for supervisors, who can alleviate it by transferring some decisions to the better-
informed workers. However, delegation of decision-making power creates additional 
asymmetric information between workers and supervisors and generates opportunities for 
workers to pursue their interests at the expense of the organization; hence delegation creates an 
AM problem. In order to contend with this problem, workers are offered incentives that better 
align their interests with those of the organization and induce them to make decisions in the 
interests of the organization. This is Prendergast’s (2002a) argument about the effect of task 
complexity on delegation and incentives (see also Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995).  
Relating the discussion above to the debate on the existence of a risk-incentives trade-
off, the overall effect of uncertainty on incentives is ambiguous because (1) it depends on the 
relative importance of TA and AM problems which create opposite responses in terms of incentives as the difficulty of the task environment increases and (2) as internal uncertainty 
induces delegation which in turn calls for the use of incentives (Prendergast, 2002a), there may 
be no empirical link between internal uncertainty and incentives after the choice of delegation 
has been accounted. We further discuss these issues in the empirical section. 
The foregoing discussion referred implicitly to delegation and incentives at the 
individual worker level. Decision-making may also be delegated to teams of workers, and team 
decision-making requires team-level incentives. Delegation to teams and other groups of 
workers rather than to individual workers is favored when group cooperation and concerted 
effort are particularly important, such as when there is substantial reciprocal interdependence 
in the tasks of employees. In the empirical section we analyze the role of uncertainty separately 
for individual, team and firm level practices. We expect the previous analysis to apply 
similarly to individual and team-level incentives and decision-making delegation. We 
conjecture that the negative effect of external uncertainty will be stronger for team and firm-
level incentives than for individual incentives because of the more direct exposure of the 
former type of incentives to the market. 
Incentives and delegation of decision-making are central but not sole elements of 
organization design. Limitations to reliance on incentives associated with risk, dysfunctional 
behavior, cost and more, require the implementation of additional practices to substitute for 
incentives or complement them to make them more effective (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995, and 
Prendergast, 1999). Monitoring and internal labor markets are familiar design elements that 
have been studied extensively by economists.  
Monitoring refers to the collection of information about signals of worker effort. It may 
be exercised continuously or at fixed or random intervals, and may be carried out by direct 
supervisors, coworkers, others with whom a worker has periodic or occasional contact (such as 
customers and trainers), or equipment (such as keyboard stroke counters and surveillance 
cameras). Monitoring may complement or substitute for incentives. On the one hand, the 
“monitoring-intensity” principle states that improving information gathering through 
monitoring can be profitable in situations where incentive intensity is high and therefore 
information is more valuable (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). On the other hand, the efficiency-wage literature considers the incentives-monitoring relationship as a tradeoff: if the cost of the 
extra pay needed to compensate risk-averse individuals to bear risk associated with incentives 
is higher than the cost of monitoring, then monitoring will be used as an alternative to 
incentives. The extent to which these two elements of organization design will be used as 
complements or substitutes in a particular situation depends on their relative (marginal) costs.
7  
  In some task environments information about various signals of worker effort can be 
collected over long periods of time through practices associated with internal labor markets 
(ILM). Such information collection does not constitute direct monitoring although has a similar 
function and may be a co-product of an activity that has additional purposes. For instance, 
promotion-from-within is based on accumulation of evidence and testimonies about workers’ 
performance, behaviors and disposition over periods of years; on-the-job training, in addition 
to imparting skills and knowledge, provides an opportunity for trainers to assess workers’ 
abilities and knowledge in controlled settings.
8 These and other ILM practices may be used in 
task environments where monitoring is particularly difficult or costly and where incentives are 
very expensive or difficult to administer because of unobservability of individual output.
9 ILM 
practices such as promotion-from-within constitute also long-term incentives, so they may 
partially substitute for short-term incentives. 
  The foregoing theoretical discussion is summarized in Figure 1. To summarize, 
organization design at the shop-floor level is crafted in view of internal uncertainty, which is 
determined by the nature of the task environment associated with core workers’ jobs. The 
direction of the effects of the task environment on individual elements of organization design is 
contingent on the specific nature of the substitution and complementarity relationships among 
them. We can predict unambiguously that internal uncertainty increases reliance on delegation 
                                                 
7 For example Demougin and Fluet (2001) show that the extent of complementarity or substitution effects 
between incentives and monitoring depends on the level of informational rent or workers liability limit (the 
agent's ability to post a bond or the principal's ability to levy a fine), and monitoring characteristics (the cost of 
increasing the precision of information and the required effort level). The relative cost of monitoring may also be 
affected by uncertainty; Prendergast (2002b) shows that in presence of supervisor favoritism, greater 
environmental uncertainty leads firms to rely more on incentives and less on monitoring. 
8 See, for example, Milgrom and Roberts (1992, ch. 11) and Baron and Kreps (2000) for a discussion of the 
various effects of internal labor markets, including improved observability.  
9 For a model of this argument in the context of academic tenure as internal labor markets, see Chen (2005). In a 
related fashion, Carmichael (1988) argues that tenure is needed to induce professors to provide specialized 
information that is not available to administrators. of decision-making. The net effect of internal uncertainty on incentives depends on the specific 
magnitude of effects that have opposite signs (see rows A, B and E). Monitoring and internal 
labor markets will also be affected by uncertainty and delegation through their link to 
incentives decisions; the direction of the effect is theoretically indeterminate because it 
depends on the net effect of internal uncertainty on incentives and on the substitution or 




III. Data and Method of Analysis 
Description of the Dataset 
Our sample is drawn from the Minnesota Human Resources Management Practices 
Survey. The survey was administered from 1994 to 1996 to 2,021 private for-profit Minnesota-
based firms with at least 20 employees, representing a broad spectrum of industries.
 In order to 
ensure representation of diverse industries, ownership forms and firm sizes a stratified 
sampling strategy was employed. The overall response rate was 43% (874 surveys). The 
survey questionnaire asked respondents about individual, group and firm-level incentives, 
various human resource practices such as training, the degree of employee participation in 
decision making, the nature of the tasks carried out by shop-floor employees, and other aspects 
of firm organization. Many of the questions focused on shop-floor or core employees, the 
largest group of non-supervisory, non-managerial employees who are directly involved in 
making the product or providing the service, such as assembly-line workers at an auto 
manufacturing factory, computer programmers in a software company, or sales representatives 
in an insurance company (Osterman, 1994).  Most of the variables employed in our analyses 
are derived from responses to the survey.
11
                                                 
10 More precise predictions about such relationships would require further assumptions about the firm and its 
environment which is beyond the scope of this paper. Our objective at this point is to emphasize their equal 
importance with delegation of decision-making for assessing the impact of uncertainty on incentives. We treat and 
later analyze the direction of such effects and related conclusions on complementarities and substitutions as 
empirical questions. 
11 The survey is available at http://webpages.csom.umn.edu/hrir/abenner/web/papers/work-surv/work-surv-01.pdf. 
The administration of the survey was supported by grants from the Center for Urban and Regional Affairs at the 
University of Minnesota and the Sloan Foundation. It was administered in two stages in order to economize on 
staff required to handle the work. The first stage included nearly 600 firms (all Minnesota publicly-traded firms Additional variables were constructed from the COMPUSTAT dataset for publicly 
traded firms (industry-level external uncertainty and capital-labor ratio), and Minnesota 
Department of Economic Security (number of employees and wage bill in sample firms). 
These data were merged with the survey data. The working sample, after deleting very large 
firms, firms that did not meet inclusion criteria (especially minimum size) and firms with 
missing information, consists of 640 firms 
 
Variables  
  Appendix Table 1 provides variable definitions, sources and descriptive statistics. The 
key variables concerning environmental uncertainty are constructed as follows. External 
uncertainty is measured by the standard deviation of the net income in the firm’s 3-digit SIC 
industry over the period 1990-1994 (the five years preceding the survey). This measure is one 
of the several measures proposed in the literature for the purpose of measurement of risk, most 
of which are correlated due to the fact that they tap into various aspects of variability over time 
in profitability (see, for example, Bromiley and Miller, 1990, and Ruefli, Collins and Lacugna, 
1999, for reviews).
12  
The internal uncertainty variable is constructed as the sum of the degree of complexity, 
variability and (reverse coding of) routine attributes of the tasks carried out by shop-floor 
workers.  Prendergast (2002a) identifies job complexity as an important dimension of 
environmental uncertainty creating the need for delegation; task complexity is one component 
of our internal uncertainty measure, and it turns out that results are very similar when using 
either measure.
13
                                                                                                                                                          
and firms that were known to have employee stock ownership plans). The second stage included 1,500 firms (all 
retail food firms and a representative sample of 958 firms from all industries excluding agriculture). In the second 
stage a few questions were added to the survey, including monitoring of core employees by their direct 
supervisors; analyses in Tables 3a and 3b, which utilize the monitoring variable, rely on about half as many 
observations as Tables 1 and 2a and 2b. See the text for details. 
12 An empirical measure of external uncertainty that affects specifically the shop floor in unavailable. As 
discussed in section II, market noise reflects an important component of external uncertainty for the shop floor, 
and it is likely that noise originating in other organization units that interact with the shop floor is correlated with 
market noise.  
13 Results based on task complexity alone as measure of internal uncertainty are available upon request. The organization design variables concern incentives, delegation of decision-making, 
monitoring, and internal labor market practices. Where data are available, we make distinctions 
between individual, group and firm level variables. Regarding incentives, we use survey data 
to distinguish the existence of individual incentive plans, group-level incentives (group bonus), 
and firm-level incentives (profit sharing, which include cash and deferred profit sharing 
plans).
14  
Delegation of decision-making to individual workers is described by two alternative 
variables, one concerning the degree of shop-floor employees’ participation in employee 
involvement programs and the other regarding the level of control these workers have over 
how their jobs are done. These variables capture related but different aspects of delegation of 
decision-making responsibilities and therefore we include them separately in the analysis. 
Delegation of decision-making to groups is captured through a dummy indicating whether or 
not the firm uses self-managed teams.  
Monitoring is captured by a single item that measures (on a scale of 1-5) the degree to 
which core employees’ work is monitored by supervisors. We create an index of internal labor 
market practices based on the sum of dummies indicating reliance on promotion from within, 
employment security, on-the-job training, and the presence of training in team building skills 
for team work.  
To control for key firm characteristics, all estimations include the firm’s industry (one-
digit SIC code), size (number of employees), age of the firm, whether it is unionized and the 
capital-labor ratio of the firm’s 3-digit SIC code industry. The capital-labor ratio is a proxy for 
firm technology, which, in addition to industry, may affect the decision to use performance-
based plans and other practices. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
  The empirical framework follows from the discrete nature of the organizational design 
variables we use to study firm optimal decisions. We assume that firms have reached 
equilibrium and operate at their optimum in terms of the combination of organization design 
                                                 
14 These plans, when offered, may be available also to workers other than shop-floor employees. practices they chose given the level of (exogenous) uncertainty they face. We do not evaluate 
the consequences of their decisions but explore and test whether their organization design 
decisions conform to the theoretical arguments illustrating the relationships between 
uncertainty and organizational design.   
We use estimation frameworks that define the likelihood of choosing incentives alone 
(Baker and Jorgensen’s argument), the likelihood of choosing a mix of incentives and 
delegation (Prendergast’s argument), or the likelihood of choosing a combination of incentives, 
delegation, monitoring and internal labor market practices.  
In particular, for an analysis of the various sources of uncertainty (internal and external) 
and their effect on incentives including a test of Baker and Jorgensen’s predictions, we use a 
linear probability model for the likelihood of choosing incentives.
15   
 We consider the following regression: 
 
Model A – Baker and Jorgensen 
(1)   Prob(Incentives) = f(X, EU, IU, ε1) 
 
where X corresponds to firm characteristics, EU stands for external uncertainty and IU for 
internal  uncertainty.    External uncertainty is expected to be negatively associated with the 
likelihood of using incentives. The effect of internal uncertainty (the task environment) on 
incentives is ambiguous, depending on the weight of AM problems that it creates (which 
increases the use of incentives) relative to TA problems it engenders (which reduces 
incentives). The sign of the coefficient associated with internal uncertainty should reflect 
which effect dominates the other. On the other hand, as mentioned in the theoretical 
discussion, a positive relationship between internal uncertainty and incentives may be the 
                                                 
15 We use the linear probability model over the logit or probit models for ease of interpretation of the coefficients 
as marginal effects. A drawback of the linear probability model is that it does not take into account that the 
dependent variable is binary and can therefore yield predicted values outside the unit interval. This problem is 
serious when the mean of the dependent variable is close to either 0 or 1 (Maddala, 1983). In our sample, the 
frequency of incentive plans are 33.6%, 23.2%, 36.4% for individual, team and profit sharing plans respectively. 
This is reasonably far from the lower and upper bounds of the unit interval. In fact, none of the predicted values of 
the variables lies outside of the unit interval except for those associated with the likelihood of group bonus but it 
is only a small percentage (1%).  result of failing to control for the instrumental and complementary role of delegation. We next 
consider that possibility by analyzing the role of uncertainty on the joint decision to delegate 
decision-making and provide incentives.  
For an analysis of firm multiple decisions including a test of Prendergast’s predictions 
about risk, incentives and delegation, we use simultaneous equations models. A simultaneous 
equations model is appropriate in this case because both incentives and other organizational 
design practices are likely to be affected by common unobservable factors. In particular, for 
Prendergast’s predictions about the relationships between uncertainty, incentives and 
delegation, we define the following empirical model: 
     
Model B - Prendergast 
  (1)  Prob(Delegation) = g(X, Z, IU, e1) 
  (2)  Prob(Incentives) =  f(X, Delegation, e2) 
 
where (e1, e2) is  bivariate normal N(0, Σ)
16 and X reflects firm characteristics. Equation (1) 
states that delegation is directly affected by internal uncertainty (IU); we expect a positive 
association between the two variables. Similarly, we expect in equation (2) a positive 
association between delegation and incentives to capture the complementary relationship 
between the two practices.  
  For identification of the model, Z includes a variable that affects the choice of 
delegation but not of incentives; the variable is a participation index computed as the sum of 
the values for each of the items that measure employee participation in decision-making on 
various issues.
17
  Prendergast (2002a)’s main argument is that the positive relationship found in the 
empirical literature on the risk-incentives relationship may be a result of failure to control for 
                                                 
16 The variance-covariance matrix Σ is non-diagonal as we assume correlation in the disturbance terms across 
equations.  
17 The information comes from a survey question (on a scale of 1 to 5): “To what extent do employees participate 
in the following issues?” and the issues listed that we select are work rules, working conditions, selection of 
personnel, training and development, social events, job redesign, safety and health, equipment maintenance, 
selection of materials, selection of new equipment, investment policies, production planning, and corporate 
finance. We find the correlations between this measure and incentives to be very low for all the incentives plans.  the firm’s decision to delegate more responsibility in the presence of internal uncertainty 
(Prendergast 2002a, p. 1097). As a result, internal uncertainty should have no effect on 
incentives once delegation has been taken into account. We evaluate this statement by testing 
for the effect of internal uncertainty (IU) on incentives in the following augmented 
specification in which IU has been added to equation (2) in the previous model B: 
   
  Model C - Prendergast 
  (1)  Prob(Delegation) = g(X, Z, IU, e1) 
  (2)  Prob(Incentives) = f(X, Delegation, IU, e2)  
 
Next we consider a more general model of the effect of uncertainty on incentives and 
other organization design practices. First, we integrate Baker and Jorgenson’s (2003) 
predictions about uncertainty and incentives by including external uncertainty to the incentives 
equation (2) of model C. Second, we reflect the substitution/complementarity relationships 
between incentives and other organization design elements by including internal labor market 
and monitoring variables in the incentives equation.  
Our analysis of the substitution/complementarity relationships between incentives and 
other organizational design practices is based on the following reasoning. Worker effort is 
extracted through organization design. We can think of effort being produced by incentives, 
monitoring and internal labor market as inputs; this is analogous to a production function 
framework in which output is produced by labor and capital and is in the spirit of Demougin 
and Fluet’s (2001) model of the incentives-monitoring relationship. Since effort is 
unobservable we use instead the firm’s average wage, which in a competitive market should be 
highly correlated with the firm’s average effort. Instead of estimating a production function, 
we estimate the relationship among incentives, monitoring and internal labor market practices 
controlling for effort (wage).
18 The estimated parameters reflect correlations among elements 
of organization design and may give an indication of the substitution (negative coefficient) or 
                                                 
18 This is analogous to estimating the relationship between labor and capital along an isoquant by controlling for 
the level of output. complementarity (positive coefficient) of the given practice with incentives.
19 The model is 
formally described below:  
  
  Model D 
(1)  Prob(Delegation) = g(X, Z, IU, u1) 
(2)   Prob(Monitoring) = h(X, Q, IU, Delegation, u2) 
(3)  Prob(ILM) = j((X, R, IU, Delegation, Monitoring, u3) 
(4)  Prob(Incentives) = f(X, EU, IU, Delegation, Monitoring, ILM, Wage, u4 )  
where (u1, u2, u3, u4) is quadrivariate normal N(0, Σ’)
20, X reflects firm characteristics and Z, Q 
and R contain variables that directly affect delegation, monitoring and internal labor market 
practices, respectively, but not the decision to provide incentives.
21
 
The model is built in a hierarchical fashion as we extend Prendergast’s argument, with 
delegation being the primary variable that is affected by the task environment, followed by an 
equation reflecting the relationships between monitoring and delegation, then another equation 
for the relationships between the index of internal labor market practices and delegation and 
monitoring and finally an equation summarizing the relationships between all these and 
incentives. The one common variable across equations is internal uncertainty for which we test 
whether it affects not only delegation but the other organizational design practices. Figure 2 
summarizes the empirical relationships we estimate. 
Whereas we have advanced reasons for the specification of the incentives equation, the 
specification of the equations that determine monitoring and ILM could be reversed.
22 We find 
                                                 
19 Correlations among organizational design practices may be caused by firms’ unobserved heterogeneity (Athey 
and Stern, 1998). The cross-sectional nature of our dataset does not permit treatment of firm-specific effects. 
Given our focus on firms’ choice of organizational design, this is less of an issue than for analysis in which the 
outcome variable is firm performance. On the other hand, the present estimation framework assumes that 
uncertainty is exogenous but it may be correlated with unobserved firm heterogeneity. If a correlation exists, it is 
likely to be positive as higher type firms (with higher managerial ability) may be better equipped for facing 
greater external and internal uncertainty. This correlation would create an upward bias in our estimates of 
uncertainty effects. As a rough check we computed the correlation between firm size (a proxy for unobserved 
managerial ability) and both of our measures of uncertainty and found no significant correlation.   
20 The matrix of variance-covariance Σ’ is non-diagonal assuming correlation in the disturbance terms across 
equations. 
21 For Q we use the number of employees per supervisor and for R we use a variable on the extent (on a scale of 1 
to 5) of employee participation in the issue of personnel training and development. that changing the order of the monitoring and ILM equations did not change our results. We 
further discuss this point in the results section. 
We use three-stage least squares to estimate all simultaneous equation models in order 
to account for the endogeneity of organizational design decisions and the presence of common 
unobservable factors.
23 Although this method does not permit identification of causal effects, it 
is informative of whether uncertainty measures and organizational design practices are 
correlated with each other.  
 
IV. Results  
The results are presented in three sets of tables in the same order as the arguments in 
the theoretical and the empirical strategy sections. The analysis concerns (a) two levels of 
delegation of decision-making – individual and team – and uses two alternative individual 
delegation measures, participation and control, and (b) three levels of incentives (individual, 
group and firm). In order to streamline the presentation we present results based on delegation 
in terms of control in the Appendix. The main sample has 640 firms, but because not all firms 
were asked the monitoring question and because there are missing observations in the wage 
variable, the sample for the most general analysis presented in Tables 3a-3b concerns 305 
observations. The last part of the analysis is devoted to robustness checks for the possibility of 
biases in the estimates due to such differences in sample size as well as checks for alternative 
specifications of model D. 
 
The Risk-Incentives Relationship on the Shop Floor 
Table 1 presents results for Model A, which tests Baker and Jorgensen’s (2003) 
hypotheses. As conjectured, external uncertainty has a negative effect on the provision of 
incentives. The impact is strong for firm-level incentive plans and weak and insignificant for 
                                                                                                                                                          
22 The alternative model is defined as follows: 
(1)   Prob(Delegation) = g(X, Z, IU, u1) 
(2)   Prob(ILM) = h(X, Q, IU, Delegation, u2) 
(3)   Prob(Monitoring) = j((X, R,  IU,
 Delegation, ILM , u3) 
(4)   Prob(Incentives) = f(X, EU, IU, Delegation, Monitoring, ILM, Wage, u4)  
23 This method also allows comparability of the coefficients with model A, which is estimated with a linear 
probability model.  individual and group-level incentive plans for shop-floor workers. In contrast, internal 
uncertainty has a significant positive effect on the likelihood of using individual and group 
incentive plans and no significant effect for the firm-level plan.
24 The positive effect suggests 
that the benefit of reducing AM problems through incentives exceeds the cost of compensating 
workers for bearing risk arising from TA problems (i.e., the balance of effects in rows A and B 
in Figure 1 is positive). This effect may also result from the instrumental role of delegation, 
that is, incentives picking up the effect of internal uncertainty on delegation. Note also that the 
R
2’s in Table 1 are very low, indicating a poor fit of the incentives equation with the data. This 
reflects the limitations of a single equation model and the importance of integrating other 
organization-design practices for the understanding of firm decisions to provide incentives. We 
address this possibility by estimating models B and C. The results are presented in Tables 2a 
and 2b.  
Results from simultaneous estimations of equations (1) and (2) of model B are 
presented in the left panel of Table 2a for individual incentives and the left panel of Table 2b 
for group (upper part of panel) and firm-level incentives (lower part of panel). As conjectured, 
internal uncertainty is associated with higher likelihood of delegation of decision-making at 
both the individual and group levels, and delegation is positively correlated with all incentives 
plans.  
The right panel presents results for Model C, testing Prendergast (2002a)’s main 
conjecture on the instrumental role of delegation. For group bonus, there is indeed no 
significant effect of internal uncertainty on incentives. For individual-level incentives, there is 
still a positive effect of uncertainty on incentives but much reduced in comparison to Table 1 
(0.018 versus 0.031) and only marginally significant. When control instead of participation is 
used as a measure of delegation (Appendix Table B1), the effect of internal uncertainty on 
                                                 
24 The reverse order of effects of the two types of uncertainty on individual, group and firm-level incentives is not 
surprising. The external uncertainty measure reflects the external market, which affects directly firm performance 
and profit sharing but much less individual and group performance at the shop-floor level and the incentives 
linked to them, whereas the internal uncertainty measure reflects the task environment, which affects directly 
individual and group-level outcomes and only indirectly firm-level outcomes. 
 
 individual incentives becomes statistically insignificant. Overall, the results in Tables 2a and 
2b for individual-level incentives and group bonuses are consistent with Prendergast (2002a).  
For profit sharing, we find that internal uncertainty significantly reduces the use of 
incentives after controlling for team delegation. This result might be due in part to internal 
uncertainty picking up effects related to external uncertainty not included in the regression. 
Another explanation might be that in response to greater internal uncertainty, firms may use 
other organizational design practices such as monitoring and ILM practices, which may 
substitute for incentives and therefore not taking such practices into account leads to finding 
such negative relationship. These explanations can be tested by estimating the more general 
model D in which external uncertainty, monitoring and ILM practices are taken into account.  
 
Additional Organization Design Responses to Uncertainty on the Shop Floor  
Tables 3a and 3b (individual-level incentives and group and firm-level incentives, 
respectively) present a more comprehensive approach to the relationship among the two types 
of uncertainty and organization design, with simultaneous equations estimation of delegation, 
monitoring, internal labor markets, and incentives. We continue to use participation as the 
measure of delegation of decision-making at the individual level; results using control as the 
measure of delegation are presented in Appendix Table B2.  
Consistent with the single-equation findings in Table 1, the results in both Tables 3a 
and 3b indicate that external uncertainty has no significant effect on individual or group-level 
incentives but significantly reduces the likelihood of using profit sharing plans. The effect of 
internal uncertainty on delegation is also similar to the effect estimated in Tables 2a and 2b.  
The effect of internal uncertainty on incentives is now clearly small and not significant 
for both individual and group incentives. However, despite the addition of controls for external 
uncertainty and other organizational design practices internal uncertainty continues to be 
associated negatively and significantly with the likelihood of using profit sharing plans. A 
possible interpretation for this result is that the cost of workers’ bearing risk from internal 
uncertainty arising from TA problems rises faster as uncertainty increases than the benefit of 
reducing AM problems through the use of firm-level incentives.  Based on the previous results, the relationship between internal uncertainty and 
incentives thus depends on the nature of incentives. In the case of individual and group-level 
incentive plans, performance is closely tied to workers’ actions and there is a strong “line of 
sight”, greater internal uncertainty is associated with a higher likelihood of using delegation 
and incentives to complement it. For firm-level incentive plans there is a weak “line of sight” 
and performance measures are not directly linked to workers’ actions, greater  internal 
uncertainty exacerbates the issue of controllability over outcomes and therefore is associated 
with a lower likelihood of using incentives, even after controlling for delegation. 
Internal uncertainty is also associated with monitoring, negatively, implying that the 
cost of monitoring increases with internal uncertainty. No significant association is found 
between internal uncertainty and ILM, possibly because ILM serves multiple functions that are 
related in opposite ways to internal uncertainty.  
  Turning now to an analysis of complementarities and substitutions among practices, we 
find that delegation is generally positively associated with monitoring and ILM, suggesting 
that these practices complement delegation of decision-making. This is consistent with the 
monitoring-intensity principle (monitoring workers to insure that they use their information 
and decision-making adequately). Regarding incentives, we find again differences that depend 
on the level at which the incentives operate. Individual and group-level incentives are not 
associated significantly with either delegation or monitoring, but are complementary with ILM. 
The results for profit sharing incentives show a different picture. In contrast, profit sharing has 
a significant positive association with team delegation, suggesting complementarity (as in 
Table 2b). Profit sharing is significantly and negatively associated with both monitoring and 
ILM, suggesting that after controlling for uncertainty, both practices substitute for incentives. 
Taken together, the results for profit sharing suggest that the benefits of increasing team 
delegation in response to greater internal uncertainty and complementing it with profit sharing 
are limited by the growing costs of monitoring, so that the net result is that, in response to 
greater internal uncertainty, firms are less likely to use profit sharing, monitoring and ILM 
practices. In order to insure the robustness of the results we performed additional analyses.
25 
First, we reran the analysis underlying Tables 1, 2a and 2b using the reduced sample (due to 
missing observations on the monitoring and wage variables) of Tables 3a and 3b, and found the 
results to be very similar. Second, we replicated the analysis for model D, reversing the 
specifications for ILM and monitoring, and again found the results to be very similar.
26  
   
V. Conclusions 
  Organization design may be viewed as a set of responses to informational issues faced 
by the firm and its workers, aimed at ameliorating agency and technical problems that cause 
workers to apply lower and less apt effort than it is in the interest of the firm. In this paper we 
have validated empirically the idea that uncertainty created by these informational issues is not 
one-dimensional. Two dimensions of uncertainty – external uncertainty that stems from 
external market factors and internal uncertainty associated with the task environment faced by 
workers and managers – have distinct and often contradictory impact on firms’ decisions about 
how to design their workplace using incentive pay, delegation, monitoring and internal labor 
market practices. Our results confirm the arguments on uncertainty presented by Baker and 
Jorgensen (2003) and the idea that incentive pay should not be seen as a single response to the 
firm’s type of task environment but as part of a system of practices including delegation, 
suggested by Prendergast (2002a), as well as monitoring and internal labor markets.  
Our results on the relationship between risk and delegation and between delegation and 
incentives are consistent with the findings of Foss and Laursen (2005) and DeVaro and 
Kurtulus (2006), who employ different measures of risk and incentives (and different datasets). 
The analysis in the present paper additionally enables us to conclude that these relationships 
hold for different levels of incentive plans - individual, group and firm. Moreover, our 
analyses, which distinguish between different sources of uncertainty and integrate multiple 
                                                 
25 The results for the robustness checks are available upon request. 
26 For individual-level plans, the alternative specification yields a significant negative association (previously 
insignificant) between monitoring and delegation, suggesting that a greater degree of delegation is accompanied 
by less monitoring of workers, as well as a significant positive association (previously insignificant) between 
monitoring and ILM, suggesting the possibility that firms uses them in a complementary fashion when deciding to 
rely on individual-level incentives.  elements of organization design at different levels, help clarify the risk-incentives tradeoff 
issue and reach the following conclusions. When risk (associated with external uncertainty or 
internal uncertainty) reduces workers’ control over their outcomes, then there is evidence of a 
risk-incentives trade-off for incentive plans with weak line of sight such as profit sharing plans. 
When risk arising from the task environment (internal uncertainty) is responsible chiefly for 
both asymmetry of information between management and workers and limited information for 
management, delegation of decision-making to workers is the best response, with individual 
and group-level incentives following.
27 We also find significant positive associations between 
delegation and monitoring and ILM practices suggesting complementarities between these 
practices. Relationships between ILM practices, monitoring and incentives seem to depend on 
the type of incentives plan.  
  This paper has presented a broader view of organization design than that available in 
previous empirical work and validated empirically, using a uniquely rich dataset, the 
complementary and substitutable roles played by various elements of organization design, and 
how different combinations of these elements are selected by firms in relationship to different 
types and levels of uncertainty. The paper has also shown that the distinction between different 
levels – individual, group and firm – enables a better understanding of organization design than 
a consideration of the firm as a single entity. Our empirical results are generally substantial in 
magnitude and statistically significant, suggesting that the relationships that we postulated 
seem to be present and meaningful in many of our sample of hundreds of firms. 
The findings of this paper answer several questions concerning the relationship 
between uncertainty and organization design, and the relations among different components of 
organization design. Several related issues that were broached but not addressed in this paper 
merit future research. One issue that merits investigation is the relationship of the task 
environment – the source of internal uncertainty – to production technology, business strategy 
and other factors that may be chosen by the firm or at least be under its influence. Another 
                                                 
27 This is the instrumental role of delegation. Unlike DeVaro and Kurtulus (2006) and Foss and Laursen (2005), 
we find strong support for it for individual and group incentives plans. Also, contrary to DeVaro and Kurtulus, we 
find evidence of endogeneity in the choice of organization design practices. We find that the correlations between 
the residuals of each practice including incentives and delegation are highly significant (results available upon 
request).  topic concerns the relative costs and benefits of different elements of organization design and 
the complementarity and substitution relations among them. Finally, there is little empirical 
evidence and only limited theoretical understanding of the effects on firm performance of the 
choice of organization design.
28 A better understanding of these issues has not only scholarly 
value by throwing light on important questions of organization, but could improve the complex 
task of organization design by helping decision-makers target better the various elements of 
organization design according to their relative costs and benefits and the relationships among 
them, and ultimately their contribution to organizational performance. 
                                                 
28 Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) provide a good starting point for such an inquiry. References 
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Figure 1. The Relationships among Task Environment, AM and TA Problems,  
Incentives and Delegation of Decision-Making 
 
  Cause Proximate  consequence  Ensuing problems   Organization design responses to 
alleviate the problems  




between workers and 
supervisors  
Workers able to pursue their 
objectives at the 
organization’s expense – 
AM problems  
Incentives linked to outcomes 
over which workers have 
influence, and other practices 
B  Difficult task 
environment 
(Internal Uncertainty) 
Incomplete information for 
workers creates 
uncontrollable risk at the 
shop floor regarding the 
outcomes of their actions  
Difficulty making informed 
decisions by workers – TA 
problems  
Incentives linked to shop 
floor outcomes will impose 
on workers risk over which 
they have only partial or no 
control  
Relevant incentives will be used 
less 
C  Risk–uncertainty  
(External Uncertainty) 
Incomplete information for 
workers creates 
uncontrollable risk 
regarding the firm’s 
outcomes  
Incentives linked to firm 
level outcomes will impose 
on workers risk over which 
they have only partial or no 
control  
Relevant incentives will be used 
less 
D  Difficult task 
environment  
(Internal Uncertainty) 
Incomplete information for 
supervisors  
Difficulty making informed 
decisions by supervisors – 
TA problems  
Delegation of decision-making to 
shop-floor workers 




between workers and 
supervisors 
Workers able to pursue their 
objectives at the 
organization’s expense – 
AM problems  
Incentives linked to outcomes 
over which workers have 








Figure 2. Empirical Relationships between Uncertainty, Delegation, Incentives and 
Monitoring and ILM  
                               
 
 
Internal Uncertainty                               Delegation                                 Incentives 
 
Monitoring                                             
                                                                        
ILM 
 










Individual        Group/Firm Level  Incentives 
Incentives







  Profit Sharing 
 




    External Uncertainty  -0.021* 
    (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
  Internal Uncertainty   0.031***  0.024***  0.000 
    (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
R
2 0.05  0.04  0.06   
N  640  640  640   
Notes: 
1- Also includes controls for industry (1-digit SIC), union, the log of firm size, firm age, and capital-labor 
ratio. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% 














Table 2b: Uncertainty, Team Delegation and Group/Firm Incentives
1











Group Bonus     
Team Delegation    0.506***    0.488*** 
    (0.102)    (0.125) 
Internal Uncertainty  0.036***    0.036***  0.001 
  (0.007)    (0.007)  (0.010) 
Chi
2 91.54  24.57  91.42  24.03 
(p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
N  640  640  640  640 
   
Profit Sharing 
Team Delegation    0.555***    0.806*** 
    (0.119)    (0.151) 
Internal Uncertainty  0.031***    0.036***  -0.029** 
  (0.007)    (0.007)  (0.012) 
Chi
2 92.22  21.81  94.06  29.21 
(p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
N  640  640  640  640 
Notes: 
1-Also includes external uncertainty and controls for industry (1-digit SIC), union, the log of firm size, firm age, and capital-labor 
ratio. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
2-Also includes a participation index that measures employee participation in decision-making on various issues. See text for details. 
***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. 
Model B  Model C 
Delegation
2 Incentives  Delegation
2 Incentives 
 
   
     
Delegation 
   
0.110*** 
   
0.066 
    (0.036)    (0.043) 
Internal Uncertainty  0.093***    0.090***  0.018* 
  (0.016)    (0.016)  (0.010) 
Chi
2 211.11  9.19  210.41  12.25 
(p-value)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.000) 
N  640  640  640  640 
Notes: 
1-Also includes controls for industry (1-digit SIC), union, the log of firm size, firm age, and capital-labor ratio. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses.  
2-Also includes a participation index that measures employee participation in decision-making on various issues. See text for details. 
***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. Table 3a: Uncertainty, Individual Incentives, Monitoring and Internal Labor Market
1
Model D   
Delegation
2 Monitoring















        (0.016) 
Internal Uncertainty  0.098***  -0.115***  0.018  0.001 
  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.050)  (0.020) 
Delegation   -  0.029  0.749***  -0.128 
    (0.110)  (0.213)  (0.115) 
Monitoring  -  -  0.323  0.003 
       (0.237)  (0.126) 
Internal Labor Market  -  -  -  0.347*** 
        (0.119) 
Chi
2 77.66  23.60  43.08  20.89 
(p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Notes: 
1-Also includes controls for industry (1-digit SIC), union, the log of firm size, firm age, and capital-labor ratio and the log of 
average wage. The number of observations is 305. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***=significant at the 1%  level, 
**=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. 
2-Also includes a participation index that measures employee participation in decision-making in various issues. See the text for 
details. 
3-Also includes the proportion of employees per supervisor.  See the text for details. 
4-Also includes a dummy indicating the extent to which employees participate in rules related to training and development.  See 

























































        (0.017) 
Internal Uncertainty  0.033***  -0.175***  -0.001   0.004 
  (0.011)  (0.033)  (0.056)  (0.024) 
Team Delegation   -  1.583***  1.992***  -0.011 
    (0.470)  (0.678)  (0.323) 
Monitoring  -  -  0.008   0.053 
       (0.252)  (0.133) 
Internal Labor Market  -  -  -  0.311*** 
        (0.072) 
Chi2  27.99  29.64  34.45  37.75 




















External Uncertainty  -  - 
    (0.019)   
Internal Uncertainty  0.032*** -0.169***  0.004  -0.099*** 
(0.011) (0.032) (0.055)  (0.030)   
Team Delegation   - 1.441***  1.864***  1.968*** 
 (0.464)  (0.686)  (0.399)   
Monitoring  - -  0.112  -0.359** 
   (0.251) (0.150)   
Internal Labor Market  - - -  -0.180** 
    (0.084)   
Chi2  34.65 27.26 33.94  42.09 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (p-value) 
Notes: 
1-Also includes controls for industry (1-digit SIC), union, the log of firm size, firm age, and capital-labor ratio and the log of 
average wage. The number of observations is 305. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***=significant at the 1%  level, 
**=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. 
2-Also includes a participation index that measures employee participation in decision-making in various issues. See the text for 
details. 
3-Also includes the proportion of employees per supervisor. See text for details. 
4-Also includes a dummy indicating the extent to which employees participate in rules related to training and development. See 
text for details. Appendix Table A1: Variable Definitions, Sources and Summary Statistics 
 


















  Group/firm-level 
incentives 






The extent to which core employees participate in an employee 




Delegation - control  The extent to which core employees have control over how their 
work is done; 1-5 scale, 1 = not at all, 5 = extreme; from survey. 
3.39 
(0.036) 
Delegation - team 
work  Existence of self-managing work teams. 0 = no, 1=yes; from survey. 
0.232 
(0.016) 
Monitoring  The extent to which core employees’ work is monitored by their 
supervisors; 1-5 scale, 1 = not at all, 5 = extreme; from survey. 
3.44 
(0.041) 
Internal labor market 
(ILM) 
Sum of promotion from within, employment security, on-the-job 
training, and training in team building skills (all dichotomous 




Uncertainty variables      
Complexity  The extent to which core employees’ work tasks are complex; 1-5 
scale, 1 = not at all, 5 = extreme; from survey. 
2.92 
(0.039) 
Variability  The extent to which core employees’ work tasks are variable; 1-5 
scale, 1 = not at all, 5 = extreme; from survey. 
3.21 
(0.039) 
Routine  The extent to which core employee’s work activities are routine; 1-5 
scale, 1 = not at all, 5 = extreme; from survey. 
3.45 
(0.034) 
Internal uncertainty  The sum of complexity, variability and reversed-routine scales, 




Logarithm of standard deviation of net income; based on 5 years of 




 Appendix Table A1: Variable Definitions, Sources and Summary Statistics - 
Continued 
 
Mean  Variable Name  Variable Definition and Source  (Std. Err.) 
Firm characteristics      
Total number of employees; from Minnesota Department of 
Economic Security. 
240  Firm size  (55.26) 
33.11  Firm age  Years in business since establishment; from survey   (1.045) 
0.174  Unionization  Firm’s unionization status; 0 = non-union, 1 = union; from survey.   
Log of capital-labor ratio (in $1000’s per worker) in 3-digit SIC 
industries; from COMPUSTAT 
4.68  Capital-labor ratio  (0.044) 
Industry     
2.8   Mining,  Construction   
36.7   Manufacturing   
2.5   Transportation   
43.6    Trade (Wholesale, Retail)   




















       
       
Delegation-Control 
   
0.138*** 
   
0.062 
    (0.044)    (0.061) 
Internal Uncertainty  0.117***    0.114***  0.018 
  (0.016)    (0.016)  (0.012) 














(0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.004) 
N  640  640  640  640 
Notes: 
1-Also includes controls for industry (1-digit SIC), union, the log of firm size, firm age, and capital-labor ratio. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses.  
2-Also includes a participation index that measures employee participation in decision-making in various issues. See the text for 
details. 
***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. 
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Appendix Table B2: Uncertainty, Individual Incentives, Delegation cum Control, 















































        (0.018) 
Internal Uncertainty  0.122***  -0.170***  -0.031  0.017 
  (0.025)  (0.033)  (0.066)  (0.026) 
Delegation - Control  -  0.405***  0.790***  -0.169 
    (0.142)  (0.279)  (0.114) 
Monitoring  -  -  0.037  0.059 
       (0.260)  (0.135) 
Internal Labor Market  -  -  -  0.325*** 
        (0.080) 
Chi2  61.02  31.46  42.24  23.03 
(p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Notes: 
1-Also includes controls for industry (1-digit SIC), union, the log of firm size, firm age, and capital-labor ratio and the log of 
average wage. The number of observations is 305. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***=significant at the 1%  level, 
**=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level. 
2-Also includes a participation index that measures employee participation in decision-making in various issues. See the text for 
details. 
3-Also includes the proportion of employees per supervisor.  See the text for details. 
4-Also includes a dummy indicating the extent to which employees participate in rules related to training and development.  See 
the text for details. 
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